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The present study explores the place of deception, prediction, and disguised intentions in 
strategic interactions. This paper refocuses on a topic that was, at one and the same time, 
evoked and neglected within the field of semiotics. Whilst semiotics professed to be the 
discipline that studies anything that can be used in order to lie, we are nowhere near this at 
this current time. Whilst this paper argues for the significance of the semiotics of deception, it 
considers one aspect of this issue, namely, the relation between prediction and deception. 
What is the relation between deception and human predictability? Does deceiving others in 
interpersonal relations presuppose a dimension of prediction? What does this type of 
imagination, that is nested in deception, consist of? What socio-cognitive skills are required 
to engage in complex acts of deception? What kind of knowledge must a successful deceiver 
have in order to mislead others? These are all relevant questions in debating deception in 
human relations. The analysis reveals the need for an evaluation of the importance of 
prediction in order to understand deception. 
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Omnis homo mendax. Forms of manipulations occur in socio-cultural domains as well as 
in nature and affect all compartments of life.1 Because deception is endemic to the human 
condition, evaluating what is true and what is false is something we all have to do. In fact, 
this skill has been essential for the evolutionary history of man and other species (Sommer 
1992; Trivers 2011) and it will be a vital asset for men’s future existence.  
Truth, fiction, illusion, manipulation, and deception are topics often reported in the media 
and discussed as academic subjects. Today, such matters are at the forefront of discussion 
arousing interest among experts and ordinary people alike. Indeed, «fake news», «post-truth», 
and «post-fact» have become the new buzzwords (Lorusso 2018; Polidoro 2018). An enquiry 
into the problem of deceit, thus, not only is of utmost importance, but also very topical. 
Deception is a very complex phenomena that has exercised a fascination upon the human 
mind for millennia. Discussion on truth, falsehood, fiction, and deceit goes back to the 
earliest day of philosophy and has continued ever since. Historically, philosophers have the 
 
1  There is no general agreement about this point. V. Sommer (1992) holds that deceit is an evolutionary trait 
that can be found both in human and non-human animals. Other scholars disagree with this view. For 
instance, H. Arendt (1972), T. Hobbes and S. Ferenczi argued that «the ability to lie is one of the criteria that 
distinguish human beings from other animals» (Barnes 1994: 3). Likewise, R. Rappaport (1979: 224) holds 
that «lying is essentially a human problem». Recent studies have investigated the subject of deception in 
animal communication with particular focus on the phenomenon of mimicry (Maran 2017; Martinelli 2004; 
2007). The bibliography on this subject is vast. Useful indications can be found in R. Mitchell and N. 
Thompson (eds.), Deception. Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit, Albany, State University of 
New York Press, 1986. 
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most to say on the subject. They have generally addressed the question of what is right and 
what is wrong in deceiving others. Because the purpose of this study is to outline the strategic 
and semiotic significance of deceit in interpersonal relations, it is useful to release the term 
from its moral weight.2 As D. Nyberg (1993: 25) pointed out, «truth telling is morally 
overrated». St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, I. Kant and many other thinkers have 
discussed this problem at length from a moral standpoint.3  
A. Greimas pointed out that the human race entered into an era in which symbolic 
manipulation became the dominant paradigm. As a result of this, the boundaries between 
plausibility and veracity, truth and certitude became blurred. The divide between what is 
regarded as true or false is constantly negotiated and questioned anew. Veracity and 
plausibility became artificially constructed effects. They are a by-product of discourse 
(Greimas 1989).  
Today, the paradigm of symbolic manipulation has seen a re-emergence through the 
widespread use of digital media. Technological advancements have brought in radical 
changes in the use of symbolic systems and the representation of reality. Through digital 
media communication, messages, images, and narratives have decoupled from their original 
sources. As a result of this it became difficult to assess the truthfulness of the speakers and 
their credibility (Ruesch 1972: 268). This issue poses important epistemological questions, 
namely, how knowledge of reality is acquired and to what extent one can assess the accuracy 
of information altogether.  
  
2. Towards a theory of deceit: a reappraisal of U. Eco’s definition of lying as the 
‘proprium of semiotics’ 
 
Deception takes many forms and the lie is, undoubtedly, one of them. One can lie through 
words, pictures (Nöth 1997), gestures (Genosko 1995), and even by means of an eloquent 
silence (Colish 1978; Mazzeo 1962). A lie would be altogether inconceivable without the use 
of signs, however. As both J. P. Sartre and F. Nietzsche note, the concept of deceit is 
quintessential to the notions of sign and representation (Castelfranchi, Poggi 1998: 19). A 
similar idea is nested in U. Eco’s depiction of semiotics as it was initially laid out in his 
Trattato di semiotica generale: «semiotics is the discipline studying everything which can be 
used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to 
tell the truth: it cannot be used to tell at all» (Eco 1976: 7).  
This definition became well-known and very fortunate. Within the disciplinary domain of 
semiotics, thus, the logic of the lie and the concept of the sign became closely intertwined as 
an offshoot of Eco’s oft-quoted definition. However, it is worth noting that elsewhere Eco 
recanted this statement and clarified his position (Eco 1997; 2017). Because this is a 
development of Eco’s original formulation that generally goes unnoticed in the literature on 
the subject, it is worthy spelling it out.  
On several occasions, Eco pointed out that semiotics should not be conceived as a theory 
of lying but rather as a theory of how it is possible to say what is not the case. This important 
explication is apparent in the following excerpt:  
 
 
2  On the concept of lying and deception, in the extra-moral sense, see Nietzsche (1873) and Scheibe (1980). 
3  For historical accounts on the philosophy and ethics of lying, see Müller (1962), Bok (1978), Nyberg (1993), 
Bettetini (2001), Tagliapietra (2001). 
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La semiosi nasce perché vogliamo parlare circa il mondo. Ma la si capisce se si intende la semiotica come la 
teoria–non della menzogna (e correggo una mia definizione del Trattato di semiotica generale)– bensì di come 
si possa dire ciò che non è il caso, o comunque ciò di cui non si può dire se sia il caso o no) (Eco 1997: 37).4 
 
In light of this remark, it would be probably more accurate to say that semiotics should be 
considered as a theory of erroneous inference rather than a theory of lying, thus, broadening 
the scope of semiotics. This shift of perspective would allow us to extend the field of 
semiotics beyond the study of sign situations where a lie may manifest, in order to include as 
semiotic phenomena instances of erroneous inference¾such as errors or 
misperceptions¾that, strictly speaking, cannot be regarded as lies.5  
This said, one would expect that the natural development of semiotics would include the 
study of the semiosis of deception and that, broadly speaking, phenomena like mistakes, 
erroneous inferences, lies, deceits, simulations, misperceptions, and all devices of 
misrepresentation would appear to be the proper domain of semiotics. In fact, quite the 
contrary is true. Despite the fame of Eco’s definition, semiotics has been almost mute on the 
subject of deception. Regrettably, in comparison to philosophers,6 theologians, psychologists, 
linguists, journalists and political scientists, semioticians have been concerned with this 
subject sparingly and did not quite keep up with advancements made in other fields. This fact 
is astounding, to put it mildly.7  
As M. Danesi (2017: 20) pointed out, «it is somewhat surprising to find that virtually no 
one has approached sign analysis from Eco’s perspective, even though it goes way back to 
1976». This claim is backed up by the paucity of semiotic research conducted on the subject, 
with the exception of a few studies (Anderson 1986; Danesi 2014; Eco 1997; Gramigna 
2011; 2013; 2020; Jervis 1970; Levin 1974; Lotman 2015; Maddox 1984; Maran 2017; Nöth 
1997; Nuessel 2013; Pelc 1992; Sebeok 1975).8 In a nutshell, the significance and theoretical 
import of the semiosis of deceit have been overlooked,9 and as such I feel that my enquiry is 
totally justifiable. Undoubtedly, there is a need to bridge such a gap.  
 
4  «Semiosis is born because we need to talk about the world. Yet we can understand it if we conceive of 
semiotics as the theory–not of the lie (and I correct a definition of mine from A Theory of Semiotics–but of 
how it is possible to say what is not the case, or in any case that of which one cannot say whether it is the 
case or not». My translation from italian. 
5  I have discussed the difference between lying and othter forms of falsehood elsewhere (Gramigna 2013). 
6  The literature on the subject from the standpoint of analytical philosophy, philosophy of language, and 
linguisticts is vast. For a recent account on the subject, see Jennifer M. Saul, Lying, Misleading, and What is 
Said. An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and Ethics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). See 
also James E. Mahon «The definition of lying and deception», in Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Standford, Standford University, 2008; A. Isenberg, «Deontology and the ethics of lying», Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 24/4, 1964, 463–480; Frederick A. Siegler, «Lying», American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 3, 1966, 128–136; L. Coleman, P. Kay «Prototype semantics: the English word lie», Language 
57/1, 1981, 26–44; F. D’Agostini, Menzogna (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2012). 
7  The historical and disciplinary reasons behind this lacuna are not known to me. These are matters that, 
however interesting, fall outside the scope of the present inquiry.  
8  It is worth noting that some scholars registered a lack of interest of Western scholarship in general about the 
issue of deception and lying. As D. Sless (1986: 28) states «It is a curios fact of Western scholarship that 
there are endless treatises on the subject of truth but few on lying». This tenet is endorsed by Barnes (1994: 
4-5), Bok (1978: 5), Raskin (1987: 445) and Shibles (1985: 24). 
9  To be accurate, Eco was not the first semiotician who foresaw the potential of lying as a semiotic problem. 
Ogden and Richards, in their seminal work, The meaning of meaning, underscored the significance of the 
problem while discussing «the treachery of language». Likewise, Charles Morris in discussing the 
informative function of signs makes an important remark about the possibility of lying through signs: 
«Lying is the deliberate use of signs to misinform someone, that is, to produce in someone the belief that 
certain signs are true which the producer himself believes to be false. The discourse of the liar may be highly 
convincing. The mere making of false statements is not lying, nor are the forms of misrepresentation lying – 
as in painting which portrays objects with characteristics which they do not in fact have. Lying is connected 
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The goal of this study is to make the case for the semiotics of deception, including a more 
detailed description of the underpinnings of this issue to encourage the discussion on such a 
fascinating yet neglected topic of research. After providing some preliminary insights into the 
concept of deception, its definitions and typologies, my intention is to focus on one specific 
angle of this phenomenon, namely, the strategic and predictive dimension embedded in 
deception, especially when this phenomenon is tackled within the frame of strategic 
interactions.  
 
3. Grappling with the concept of «deception»: some theories of deceit 
 
The field of study that focuses on deceit is vast and complex. To begin, a general 
discussion and definition of the concept of «deception» is relevant. At present, a systematic 
science of deceit does not exist and studies conducted on the subject in other scientific 
domains, albeit very valuable, were fragmentary and unsystematic (Castelfranchi, Poggi 
1998: 18). Because its nature is multifaceted, the study of deception requires a 
multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach. 
There seems to be a conundrum about defining «deception». Let us be clear that there is 
no complete agreement among experts in this field of research. Several authors have ventured 
into the study of the subject reaching inconsistent and divergent conclusions. In the research 
to date, a universally accepted definition of «deception» does not exist, let alone an 
independent and objective methodology for identifying certain phenomena as cases of 
deception (Bavelas et al. 1990: 175). Different authors have each offered their opinion. The 
difference in judgments on the interpretation of this concept is due to the non-homogeneity of 
the criteria used on each occasion by the scholars for the elucidation.  
The deception construct has unavoidable overlapping with other forms of 
misrepresentation and distortion of reality that despite having some features in common, must 
nonetheless be distinguished. With this understanding, the concept of deception has been 
widely extended to a host of complex phenomena¾lying, simulation, fabrication, feigning, 
pretence, mimicry, hypocrisy, disguise, error, camouflage, non-serious talk, to mention but a 
few. McGlone and Knapp (2010: 186) have aptly termed such phenomena as «blood 
relatives» of deception. This overlapping, however, is often a source of confusion.  
As I will argue next, some authors considered the intentional aspect of deceit as 
significant; while others, in contrast, opted for an informational criterion¾the management 
of information. Whilst scholars have generally studied the issue of deception from the 
perspective of language, truth-telling, assertion, intentionality, goals and effects and so forth, 
I will, instead, start from a different premise and make the case, after reviewing some 
theories of deceit, for treating deception in connection with prediction. 
 
3.1 Lying and deceiving 
 
Let us first briefly examine a dictionary definition of the term «deception», and then 
proceed with an overview of the main criteria used in scholarly discussions for outlining what 
constitutes deception. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) formulates the definition of 
«deception» as follows: «to cause to believe what is false». 
This definition is quite broad and general and is a good starting point for the discussion. 
Firstly, it posits that deception is a kind of action. This action is geared towards a specific 
 
with the informative function, regardless of which kinds of signs are used for the purpose of misinforming» 




goal, namely, to lead someone to believe [as true] what is false. The OED definition is as 
broad as to include in the genus of deception both intentional and non-intentional types of 
untruthfulness. Intentional deception occurs when an agent intentionally causes another to 
believe what is false. Non-intentional deception occurs inadvertently. A subject who is led 
into a perceptual error by misleading appearances without any human agency that 
intentionally caused this to happen is a good illustration of non-intentional deception.  
 This is a problematic node in the OED’s definition because the distinction between 
intentional and non-intentional types of deception remains concealed. By placing the two 
modalities of deception under the same head, without any further qualification, this definition 
remains rather ambiguous.  
A further loci of semantic ambiguity that is common to deception studies concerns the 
definitions of «deception» and «lying» which, in numerous scholarly treatments, fall into the 
same basket. Given the lack of homogeneity of the criteria used for the definition, it is not 
surprising that the notion of deception often intertwines with definitions of what is to lie and 
the whole outfit of insincerity. From this standpoint, lying and deception are treated in 
tandem because both phenomena tend to include an element of intentionality¾the intent to 
deceive¾as a necessary criterion for the definition. L. Coleman and P. Kay (1981), for 
instance, identify the intent to deceive as essential to the prototypical definition of the lie.  
Whilst some scholars (Ekman 1985: 26) use «deceit» and «lying» as interchangeable 
words, others distinguish the two concepts on the basis of whether or not the victim is 
successfully deceived.10 In other words, from this standpoint the criterion for discerning 
between lying and deceiving is the effect that deceit exercises upon the victim. Whilst a lie 
that is seen through is still a lie regardless of its success, an act of deception that is uncovered 
by the dupe can no longer be regarded as an act of deception. In this connection, G. Ryle 
(1949: 114) notes that «to deceive» is a verb of success and, as such, it signifies «not merely 
that some performance has been gone through, but that something has been brought off by 
the agent going through it».  
J. Mahon is an advocate of this view. Claiming, as does Ryle, that «to deceive» is a 
«success or achievement verb» (Mahon 2007; 2008: 211), Mahon presents the following 
distinction: 
 
Whether or not an act of deceiving has occurred depends on whether or not a particular effect – normally, 
the having of a false belief – has been produced in another. […] In this respect, deceiving differs from lying. 
[…] Whether or not an act of lying has occurred does not depend on whether or not a particular effect has been 
produced in another; if no effect has been produced in another, then the act of lying may have occurred 
nevertheless. Properly speaking, therefore, lying is not a type of deceiving (Mahon 2007: 181). 
 
T. L. Carson endorses a similar view. He holds that «unlike ‘lying’ the word ‘deception’ 
connotes success», therefore «an act must actually mislead someone (cause someone to have 
false belief) if it is to count as a case of deception» (Carson 2010: 55).  
In contrast to this view, S. Bok, claims that lying is a sub-category of deception. The 
author distinguishes deceptive statements (e.g. lies) from other forms of deception by arguing 
that in a lie the message must be stated: 
 
When we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages meant to mislead them, 
meant to make them believe what we ourselves do not believe. We can do so through gesture, through disguise, 
be means of action or inaction, even through silence. Which of these innumerable deceptive messages are also 
lies? I shall define as a lie any intentionally deceptive message that is stated. Such statements are most often 
 
10  I use the terms «victim» and «dupe» intercheangeably. By these two terms I refer to the subject or subjects 
to whom the act of deception is directed to. 
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made verbally or in writing, but can of course also be conveyed via smoke signals, Morse code, sign language, 
and the like. Deception is the larger category, and lying forms part of it (2003 [1978]: 13-14). 
 
A similar view can be also found in Betz (1985: 221), Simpson (1992: 623), and (Vasek 
1986: 271).  
 
 
3.2 The intention to deceive 
 
The crux of the matter in defining lying and deceiving revolves around the notion of the 
intention to deceive. The point of contention is whether an explicit intention to deceive is to 
be taken as an essential element in the definition of the lie (Gramigna 2020).  
In an influential article titled «The Intent to Deceive» (1977), R. Chisholm and T. Feehan 
spell out an eightfold taxonomy of cases in which a person L may deceive a person D with 
respect to a proposition p, whereby p is false. The two philosophers discern eight basic ways 
used to deceive, which they divide on the basis of three main criteria: 
 
(i) Deception by «commission» / «omission»; 
(ii) «Positive» / «negative» deception; 
(iii) Deception simpliciter / deception secundum quid. 
 
The «commission/omission» dichotomy is predicated upon the causal contribution of the 
deceiver toward the victim’s belief. The distinction between «positive» and «negative» 
deception is predicated upon the way in which the deceiver alters the pre-existent stock of 
beliefs accepted or held by the dupe. When a «positive» deception occurs, a false belief is 
either being acquired or retained by the dupe due to the deceiver contributing causally 
towards it. In the case of «negative» deception, the deceiver causes the victim either to lose a 
true belief or entails the prevention from acquiring a true belief.  
Moreover, the distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid signals whether L has 
brought about the change or not. The deception simpliciter implies that «L brought about the 
change from the state of not being deceived with respect to p» (Chisholm and T. Feehan 
1977: 144). The juxtaposition of the three criteria listed above renders a matrix of eight 
possibilities of deception. Four of them are grouped under the rubric of «deception by 
commission» and another four falls under the head of «deception by omission». The table 





Types of deception Omission 
(a) L contributes causally 
toward D’s acquiring 
the belief in p 
Positive deception simpliciter L allows D to acquire the 
belief in p 
(b) L contributes causally 
toward D’s 
continuing in the 
belief in p 
Positive deception secundum 
quid 
L allows D to continue the 
belief in p 
(c) L contributes causally 
toward D’s ceasing to 
believe in not-p 
Negative deception 
simpliciter 
L allows D to cease to have 
the belief in not-p 
(d) L contributes causally Negative deception L allows D to continue to 
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toward preventing D 
from acquiring the 
believe in not-p 
 
secundum quid have the belief in not-p 
 
Table 1. The eight basic types of deception outlined by Chisholm and Feehan (1977). 
 
In light of the eightfold taxonomy of deception Chisholm and Feehan outlined, the following 
definition can be gleaned: 
 
To deceive is to contribute causally toward another person acquiring a false belief, or continuing to have a 
false belief, or ceasing to have a true belief, or preventing another person from acquiring a true belief, or to 
allow another person to acquire a false belief, or to continue to have a false belief, or to cease to have a true 
belief, or to allow another person to continue without having a true belief (Mahon 2007: 186). 
 
Despite the high degree of sophistication of this approach, there is one aspect that remains 
obscure and is unresolved in Chisholm and Feehan’s account. As Mahon (2007) pointed out, 
whilst to contribute causally toward another person acquiring a false belief falls into the 
category of deception, to allow another person to continue without having a true belief is a 
difficult case and it could be argued that this is not strictly speaking a case of deception. In 
other words, «allowing a person to remain ignorant, or allowing a person to become ignorant, 
is not deceiving that person» (Mahon 2007: 187). 
    
3.3 Deception as a device of information manipulation 
 
Communication scholars as well as psychologists have focused on the concept of 
information as the benchmark to the study of deception. Information facilitates control and 
knowledge confers supremacy. Information management is a complex phenomenon ruled by 
a logic of concealment and revelation. Whilst reciprocal knowledge is a precondition for 
human interactions, the sharing of knowledge is always partial because the distribution and 
access to information are unequal. In the presence of unfriendly or hostile processes, whose 
goals conflict with friendly goals, information can be altered and obfuscated for the purpose 
of gaining personal advantages, maintaining supremacy or for the promotion of other 
disruptive goals. Accurate information is key, especially in the strategic interactions where it 
is «of interest for one party to an interaction to be able to predict the course of action or 
thought of the other party» (1979: 4). 
As M. Knapp and M. Comadena (1979: 271) note, deception is thought of as «the 
conscious alteration of information a person believes to be true in order to significantly 
change another’s perceptions from what the deceiver thought they would be without the 
alteration». Bavelas argues much the same thing and proposes that «the primary definition [of 
deception] must be informational, that is, based on the truth or falsity of the information 
represented in the message. This dimension can be called truthfulness-falsity, or distance 
from truth» (Bavelas et a. 1990: 175). Likewise, K. Scheibe conceives of mirrors, masks, lies, 
and secrets as «techniques for the manipulation of information» and regards them as «the 
major devices of the strategic armamentarium» (Scheibe 1979: 52). Such devices operate 
following the binary logic of detecting/ concealing information and serve different functions, 
either protective and/or intrusive. 
G. Durandin, in his study Les fondements du mensonge (1972), pointed out a parallel 
between deception and concealment. These strategies can be used either for offensive 
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(prevarication) or defensive purposes (survival).11 The common feature between deception 
and concealment lies in its ability to alter and distort the informational capital at the disposal 
of a living organism. Because the very essence of social life depends upon the existence of 
mutual trust between the members of society and «all relationships of people rest upon the 
precondition that they know something about each other» as G. Simmel (1906: 441) stated 
more than a century ago, deceit, thought of as a breakdown of trust and mutual confidence, 
undermines the foundations of society itself.  
The altering of the relationship between the deceiver and the dupe, with respect to the 
access to information as well as the distribution of power, is an important aspect of this 
phenomenon. The privileged position of the deceiver (both in terms of information and 
power), as compared to the one to whom the deceit is directed, compromises the balance 
between the participants of the human interaction in favour of the one who orchestrates the 
deceit.12 In this respect, deception can be seen as having an intrinsic connection with 
violence. Deception perpetuates powerlessness in others by coercing them into believing an 
altered depiction of reality. 
This is particularly illuminated in the seminal study of S. Bok (2003 [1978]: 27), where 
deceit and violence are «the two forms of deliberate assault on human beings». The privilege 
inherent in the deceit, as has been described above, affects the exercise of power in an 
identical measure in which the access to knowledge confers supremacy. Therefore, there 
exists, for Bok, a biunivocal correspondence between deceit and power. Deception manifests 
an insidious influence through the manipulation of information to the extent that it coerces 
the choice-making process of the dupe. 
 
3.4. The nexus between perception and deception 
 
It is often said that appearances are deceiving, and rightly so, for this tiny piece of wisdom 
is worth pondering. Perception and deception are interlocked phenomena more than one 
would dare to think. The nexus between perception and deception has not escaped the 
attention of those who have tackled the problem of deceit and illusion from the standpoint of 
magic (Jastrow 1900) and strategic intelligence (Whaley 1969; 1982). Deception should be 
framed within a general theory of perception because, strictly speaking, deceit falls within the 
facts of «misperception» (Whaley 1982). As Whaley (1969: 180) remarks, «deception is one 
form or mode of perception. Specifically, it falls in that main division of perception called 
misperception». 
A preliminary definition of deception presupposes a perceiving subject, an act of 
perception, and a perceived object. Deception is grafted upon sense perception inasmuch as 
deception implies a subject who perceives an object in his immediate environment. Deception 
does not lie in the things themselves but is predicated upon the perception of a subject. By 
drawing on the work of the physiologist H. von Helmholtz and the neuropsychologist R. L. 
Gregory, Whaley (1982: 180) conceives of perception in terms of «hypotheses» based on an 
unconscious inference.  
The human brain draws inferences based on the sensory inputs that it receives from the 
environment. Upon receiving the incoming data, a part of it is filtered, processed and stored. 
This forms the basis for making inferences. Gregory (1973: 62-63) explains that the 
phenomenon of illusions should be assessed against the background of the cognitive process 
of inference-making because illusions are failed or «misplaced hypothesis». Illusions occur 
 
11  On this point, see Knapp et al. (2016: 78-82). For a critical review on Information Manipulation Theory 
(IMT), see Levine (2020: 292-332). 
12  Here I often use the term «liar» in order to refer to the subject who designs and tells a lie. However, it would 
be more appropriate to use this expression to refer to those who have the habit of lying.  
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either due to a malfunctioning of the physiological perceptual input mechanism or when our 
cognitive abilities for making appropriate hypotheses misfires (Whaley 1982: 182). When the 
subject fails to form an accurate hypothesis about an object, a fact or an event, then, «sense 
deception» (Jastrow 1901) or «misperception» (Whaley 1982) occur. 
Whaley has classified classes of misperception, including deception, as the chart below 
depicts (Fig. 1): 
 
 
Fig. 1. Whaley’s typology of perception (adapted from Whaley 1982: 180). 
 
Misperception can be either induced by others or self-induced, and deliberate or 
unintentional. Whaley considers deception within the frame of the psychology of 
misperception and defines it as follows: 
 
Deception is the distortion of perceived reality. Operationally, it is done by changing the pattern of 
distinguishing characteristics (charcs) of the thing (whether object or event) detected by the sensory system of 
the target. The task (purpose) of deception is to profess the false in the face of the real (Whaley 1982: 182). 
 
From this definition it can be gleaned that deception alters the perception of reality 
through the distortion of the patterns of the object perceived. Moreover, deception entails a 
primitive concept of what is false that overlays with the real.  However, an explication of 
what is meant by «false» in Whaley’s definition of deception is left unattended. We can 
tentatively define falsity in a broad sense as that which is other than it seems.  
For the present study, I will employ the definition of deception outlined by Castelfranchi 
and Poggi (1998: 55): 
 
Deceit is an act or a trait of an organism (M) whose goal is to prevent another organism (I) from gaining true 
knowledge. This knowledge should be relevant to the organism (I). Moreover, M’s deceptive goal should not be 
revealed to I.13 
 
 
13  My translation from Italian: «Un inganno è un atto o un tratto di un organismo M che ha la finalità di non far 
avere a un organismo I una conoscenza vera che per quell’organismo è rilevante, e che non rivela tale 

















This definition is predicated upon five essential features (Castelfranchi and Poggi (1998: 
56-60): 
1. The notion of act included in the definition should be understood in broad terms. An 
act can be verbal or non-verbal. The lie is a typical illustration of a verbal act. Pretence 
or simulation is an example of a non-verbal act. An act can also entail inaction, the act 
of not acting. An omission is an example of inaction; 
2. Deception entails a conscious intention. In other words, an act of deception 
presupposes awareness on the side of the deceiver of the deceptive goal. The deceiver 
intends to deceive and he or she is aware of it; 
3. Deceit entails the prevention that another organism gains true knowledge. Here, «true 
knowledge» refers to subjective knowledge. In other words, what the subject assumes, 
takes or believes to be true; 
4. Relevant knowledge: the prevention from gaining true knowledge should have 
relevance for the organism M; 
5. Meta-deception: deceit entails that the intention of M of not letting the other organism 
I to gain true knowledge is covert, so it should not be revealed to I. 
 
I will now turn to a brief discussion of the main ways of deceiving.  
 
3.4.1 Two modes of deceiving: simulation and dissimulation 
 
There is one common theme that runs through the study of deception, namely, the 
distinction between «simulation» and «dissimulation». The two terms are generally 
contrasted one against the other and yet they are two facets of the same coin. This macro-
distinction has served as the basis to discern two large modalities of deceiving, one geared 
upon the logic of secrecy and the other on revelation.  
The meaning of the Latin term simulatio has a long pedigree and its rich semantic history 
cannot be dispensed with in a few words. Simulare derives from similis («simile») and it 
means to make something similar, «to feign» what is not, «to pretend». Dissimulare, in 
contrast, comes from simulare with the addition of dis- which implies a contrary and negative 
meaning. Dissimulare in fact means «making something unrecognisable», «to conceal», «to 
hide». The Latin term simulator harkens back to the Greek word hypocrita. There is a 
semantic correspondence between these two words. However, their connotation is different.  
Whilst the ancient meaning of the Greek hypocrita meant «actor» and it had a somewhat 
neutral connotation, the Latin terms simulo/simulatio/simulator took on a negative 
connotation and a moral overlay within the biblical and Christian tradition. A simulator is a 
person who ostensibly feigns to have virtue that he does not possess (Portalupi 2004: 448). In 
the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas discusses the problem of dissimulation and 
explains the meaning of «hypocrite» by quoting both Isidore and St. Augustine. For Aquinas 
hypocrisy consists truly in one appearing other than he is, that is to say, acting so as «to seem 
what he is not». Aquinas defines hypocrisy as «a kind of dissimulation whereby a man 
simulates a character which is not his» (Q. 111, A. 3, c.). 
Torquato Accetto (1997 [1641]: 11), in his Della dissimulazione onesta, defines 
«simulation» as to appear what one is not and «dissimulation» not to appear what one is («La 
dissimulazione è un’industria di non far vedere le cose come sono. Si simula quello che non 
si è, si dissimula quello ch’è»). Not dissimilarly, Francis Bacon analysed simulation and 
dissimulation among the strategies of hiding and veiling oneself: 
 
There be three degrees of this hiding and veiling of a man’s self. The first, closeness, reservation, and 
secrecy; when a man leaveth himself without observation, or without hold to be taken, what he is. The second, 
dissimulation, in the negative; when a man lets fall signs and arguments, that he is not that he is. And the third, 
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simulation in the affirmative; when a man industriously and expressly feigns and pretends to be that he is not 
(Bacon 1838: 387). 
 
If one considers deception as geared upon the dichotomies of hiding and showing or 
concealment and revelation, simulation and dissimulation can be respectively thought of as 
two sides of deception. Whilst dissimulation is covert, it hides the real, and «its task is to 
conceal or at least to obscure the truth», simulation is overt, it shows the false, and «its task is 
to pretend, portray, profess an intended lie» (Whaley 1982: 183). What is important to stress 
is that simulation and dissimulation often occur in tandem. Both dissimulation and simulation 
operate though a plethora of devices and operations. Whaley singles out three ways to 
dissimulate and three ways to simulate, one representing the counterpart of the other. Hiding 
the real can be done «by making it invisible» (masking), «by disguising» (repackaging), «by 
confusing» (dazzling). Showing the false can be done «by having one thing imitate another» 
(mimicking), «by displaying another reality» (inventing), «by diverting attention» (decoying) 
(Whaley 1982: 185). 
Another way to unravel the logic behind the duplet simulation/ dissimulation is to couch 
these two strategies of deceiving in terms of an additive or subtractive quality. Guillaume 
Leonce Duprat (1903) is very explicit on this point. Duprat, who was an advocate of the 
scientific study of lying, designates the lie as a suggestion of error because it aims at «the 
production in another of a representation without objective value or of a judgment would not 
be able to confirmed by experience» (Duprat 1903: 16).14  
Among the varieties of lies, Duprat (1903: 23) distinguishes between simulation and 
dissimulation. Whilst simulation operates through addition, dissimulation works by means of 
subtraction. He terms these two modalities of lying or suggestion of error «positive 
suggestion» (simulation) and «negative suggestion» (dissimulation). Simulation adds 
elements to the accurate depiction of reality in a variety of ways, by invention, by 
exaggeration or by making things up completely. Attributes can be added to people as well as 
to facts, events and situations. Duprat (1903: 16) distinguishes four sub-categories which 
further expounds the ways in which simulation operates: 1) by «illegitimate attribution»; 2) 
by «addition»; 3) by «recombination»; 4) by «pure fiction».15  
Opposite to simulation there are other forms of deceit that are catalogued under the rubric 
of dissimulation, which includes denial, suppression, attenuation, negation, false testimony. 
To summarise, simulation adds up elements to the true description of reality whereas 
dissimulation suppresses elements that should be included in the true depiction of reality. 
 
14  My translation from French: «le mensonge a pour fin la production chez autrui d’une representation sans 
valeur objective et d’un jugement que l’expérience ne saurait confirmer». 
15  My translation from French. The original text uses the following terminology: 1) «attribution illégitime»; 2) 




Table 2. A taxonomy of lies or modes of suggestions of error (adapted from Duprat 1903: 
24) 
 
It is also worth noting that Duprat pointed out that lying and belief are closely interlocked 
and that belief is a gradual phenomenon. Moreover, he noted that lies need to adapt to the 
degree of belief that aims to produce (Duprat 1903: 16). 
 
 
4. Imagining others: representing the other’s mind and perspective-taking in deception 
 
Psychologists have generally focused on the way in which the ability to lie is acquired as a 
skill throughout child development (Vasek 1984; 1986) and the psychological reasons why 
people lie (Fechheimer 1936; Krout 1931; 1932). Valuable studies were also conducted on 
gender and socio-contextual differences in telling lies (DePaulo et al. 1996) and lie detection 
via non-verbal cues and facial expressions (Ekman 1985; 2009; Ekman and Rosenberg 2005). 
The latter approach to deception holds that truth is written on people’s faces. In other words, 
signs of deception are inscribed in micro-expressions used by the lie detector in order to spot 
a liar.  
For Paul Ekman lying to others entails two main strategies, concealment and falsification. 
Whilst «in concealing the liar withholds some information without actually saying anything 
untrue», in falsifying «not only does the liar withhold true information but he presents false 
information as if it were true» (Ekman 1985: 28). Deceit is often a combination of both 
(Ibid.). What Ekman termed «concealment» may be understood as lying by omission. 
However, this point deserves further qualification. Concealment as a strategy of withholding 
information may or may not entail an intention to mislead. If concealment does not entail an 
intention to deceive it can hardly be called a lie. Thus, one must distinguish between 
concealment and secrecy because the two concepts are intertwined.16  
 
16  S. Bok comments on this difference: “Lying and secrecy differ, however, in one important respect. Whereas 
I take lying to be prima facie wrong, with a negative presumption against it from the outset, secrecy need not 
be. Whereas every lie stands in need of justification, all secretes do not (Bok 1983: XV). On this fascinating 
connection between deceit and secrecy, see Scheibe (1979: 91-100) and Bakan (1954). 
MODES OF SUGGESTION OF ERROR
(or CLASSIFICATIONS OF LIES) 
A) POSITIVE SUGGESTION














There is an additional aspect that is worth pondering. This has to do with the hypothesis 
that an act of successful deception entails the representation of the other’s mind 
(Castelfranchi e Poggi 1998) and the ability to take the perspective of the other (Flavell 1968; 
Hyman 1989) as essential prerequisites for deception. Moreover, this standpoint leads to the 
idea that deception may involve a certain degree of premeditation, which in turn requires 
planning and design from the side of the deceiver (Hopper and Bell 2009). In this section I 
will explore the ramifications these issues have for the concept of deception. 
The ability to take the perspective of the other and to be in someone else’s shoes was 
underscored both by G. H. Mead (1934) with the concept of «the generalised other» and by J. 
Piaget (1932) in his study on egocentrism. The ability to impute mental states to themselves 
and to others, termed «the theory of mind», has found fertile ground in philosophy. Here the 
term used is «meta-representation». Developmental psychologists and cognitive social 
psychologists have long recognised the importance of the concept of perspective and role-
taking in the explanation of the psychological development of the child. In this connection, it 
is noteworthy that the literature shows evidence that there is an important link between the 
rise of deception in children and the ability of perspective-taking (Selman 1980).17  
Hartshorne and May, in their first study on children’s deception based their analysis on 
children’s own accounts of deceptive acts, defining deception as follows: «the conscious 
method of circumventing the will of another by misleading the other as to one’s own will» 
(Hartshorne and May 1928: 13). Empirical studies suggest that children not only develop an 
awareness of other agent’s intentions (namely, the attribution of intentions of a first-level 
order), but also that children achieve an awareness of other people’s awareness of other’s 
intentions (attribution of second-order beliefs). T. Shultz and K. Cloghesy (1981) refer to this 
aspect as the «recursive awareness of intention» in social interactions. The authors provide 
evidence that such type of awareness of intention does not appear before the age of five 
(Shultz and Cloghesy 1981: 469). Although perspective taking is not the only ingredient that 
enables deception, it is certainly an important aspect to be considered in connection with the 
very possibility of deception. As C. Schmidt argues: 
 
Other persons also possess belief systems and therefore in communicating with another one must recognise 
that the overt action, which has been termed the message, will be interpreted by others within the context of 
their beliefs about the actor’s plan and motive. Thus, the theory of human action is essentially recursive 
(Schmidt 1975: 199). 
 
Schmidt goes a step further by making the case for recursive thinking to be the 
precondition for engaging with strategic actions that involve deception and the disguise of 
intentions for deceptive purposes (Schmidt 1976). Vasek makes this point very clear: 
 
Engaging in or coping with deception requires that the child interacts socially, communicates clearly, and 
understand how the communications of others are to be taken. These requirements, in turn, involve perspective-
taking skills, communicational competence, and an understanding of intentionality. Though conceptually 
distinguishable, these social-cognitive skills appear to be mutually dependent. If one is to understand children’s 
(and adult’s) deceptions, one must understand these social-cognitive capacities and how they make deception 
possible. In fact, one might operationalise the concept of deception as «communicating untruthful information 
with the intention of altering another person’s perspective of a situation in ways inappropriate to the other’s 
perceived goals» (Vasek 1986: 276). 
 
In this framework, deception is possible when one can master such abilities. Selman 
shows clearly the connection between the possibility of deception in children and the ability 
 
17  For a review of the literature on children deceits with particular reference to verbal deception (the lie), see 
Vasek (1986), Rotemberg and Rotenberg (1991).  
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to take the perspective of the other. In his study he singled out five levels of perspective 
taking (from Level 0 to Level 4) that show an increasing level of social complexity. Selman 
notes that deceptive actions occur starting at Level 2 when the child is able to «articulate that 
he or she is trying to act in ways that will mislead the opponent without the opponent being 
aware that the self is aware that the opponent is being misled. In effect the child 
acknowledges that the other is trying to figure out the self’s motives» (Selman 1980: 60). As 
Wimmer and Perner pointed out, «the practical importance of representing another person’s 
wrong beliefs consists in the use of this representation as a frame of reference for interpreting 
or anticipating the other person’s actions» (1983: 106). 
 
5. Prediction in deception: outsmarting others in strategic interactions 
 
Erving Goffman (1969: 100-101) defines «strategic interactions» as follows: 
 
Two or more parties must find themselves in a well-structured situation of mutual impingement where each 
party must make a move and where every possible move carries fateful implications for all of the parties. In this 
situation, each player must influence his own decision by knowing that the other players are likely to try to dope 
out his decision in advance, and many even appreciate that he knows this is likely. Courses of action or moves 
will then be made in the light of one’s thoughts about the other’s thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves 
made on the basis of this kind of orientation to self and others can be called strategic interaction.  
 
It is from this standpoint that I shall attempt to view the problem before us. What Goffman 
termed «dope out» is a type of predictive mode of thinking that allows an agent to figure out 
and decipher in advance the decisions to take by an act of forward thinking. By capitalising 
on Goffman’s intuition, I make the case that such a predictive mode of thinking–which is 
strategic and future-oriented to its core–plays an important role in strategic interaction and, 
therefore, its significance should not be overlooked. As we pointed out in the preceding 
sections, theories of deception have generally focused on definitional criteria that do not 
necessarily and explicitly include this factor, which is either left in the background or 
considered as an implicit element in deceptive acts. For this reason, my intention is to bring 
this feature to the foreground and to unpack its significance. 
My theoretical interest, thus, lies in the special kind of mutual mind-modelling that goes 
on between the parties to an interaction that engages in deception. Because this aspect is 
particularly visible in the contexts of strategic interactions, I decided to take two illustrations 
of such interactions as explanatory models for supporting my claim. In strategic settings 
when one is wary of the possible moves of the other, it is not surprising to see that calibrating 
and recalibrating plans of actions, anticipating the moves of other parties in the interaction, 
and disguising and guessing intentions, are factors of paramount importance. In such types of 
interaction there is a deceptive game–based on imagination, guessing and, surprise–in which 
each party to the interaction seeks to outsmart the other. What is important to stress is that in 
these settings, each participant to the interaction tailors his or her behaviour to the that of the 
other, like in a mirror reflection. 
 
5.1 The mistrustful hearer: two cases of deception 
 
In order to make a case for prediction as an element embedded in deception, I draw on an 
illustration that comes from the philosophical discussion of lying and deceiving set forth in 
St. Augustine’s De mendacio, a treatise on falsehood written more than fifteen hundred years 
ago.18 St. Augustine introduces two interesting case studies on the assumption that the hearer 
 
18  I have dealt with St. Augustine theory of lying at length elsewhere (Gramigna 2020). 
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is in any case sceptical–that is, he has no trust in the speaker. According to this prerequisite, 
the speaker has to calibrate his communicative strategy to the particular system of beliefs 
held by the hearer. In other words, the speaker must calibrate his or her moves by anticipating 
that of the other. If someone expects not to be believed because the hearer is mistrustful, the 
speaker then could follow one of the following strategies: either telling a falsehood so that the 
truth could be inferred from a false statement, or telling the truth in order to deceive. 
Here is the first case as described in chapter four of De mendacio: 
 
In the first place, we have a person who knows or thinks that he is speaking falsely, yet speaks in this way 
without the intention of deceiving. Such would be the case of a man who, knowing that a certain road is 
besieged by bandits and fearing that a friend for whose safety he is concerned will take that road, tells that 
friend that there are no bandits there. He makes this assertion, realizing that his friend does not trust him, and 
because of the statement to the contrary of the person in whom he has no faith, will therefore believe that the 
bandits are there and will not go by the road.19 
 
The analysis of the first situation designates the case of a falsehood that is put through not 
for deception but in order not to deceive. The conditions set for the analysis of this case are 
the following: 1) the listener’s mistrust; 2) the speaker’s benign motif; 3) speaker states what 
is not the case – the speaker states that there are no robbers along a certain road, while it turns 
out that the contrary is the case. 
St. Augustine in fact sets out the first scenario by considering the case in which someone, 
who is aware that a certain road is besieged by robbers, tells the contrary of what he assumes 
to be the case to a mistrustful traveller, whose intention is to proceed with his journey along 
that road. Whilst it is the case (de facto) that there are robbers along a certain road, the 
speaker tells the traveller the opposite of what is the case, namely, that there are no robbers 
along the road where the traveller intends to walk. The speaker, then, makes a statement that 
the de facto is false.  
However, the speaker in question is moved by a benign motif. He is in fact concerned for 
the wellbeing of the traveller, who may be in jeopardy if he takes the wrong direction. This 
motif prompts him to speak a falsehood. He has a positive agenda because his goal is 
avoiding a potential harm to another person. Capitalising on the traveller’s mistrust, the 
speakers tells the contrary of what he takes to be true. Because the listener has no confidence 
in the interlocutor, the speaker predicts that the traveller would choose a different direction 
from the one indicated by the speaker since he would not believe him, thus, avoid the bandits. 
The second case is the reverse of the first one: 
 
In the second place, there is the case of a person who, knowing or thinking what he says to be true, 
nevertheless says it in order to deceive. This would happen if the man mentioned above were to tell his 
mistrustful acquaintance that there are bandits on that road, knowing that they actually are there and telling it so 
that his hearer, because of his distrust of the speaker, may proceed to take that road and so fall into the hands of 
the bandits. Now, which of these two men is lying? Is it he who chooses to tell a falsehood without the intention 
to deceive, or is it he who chooses to tell the truth with the intention to deceive?20 
 
In the example above, the speaker is consciously asserting something that he knows to be 
true in order to deceive his listener. He uses the truth strategically in order to lead the hearer 
into error, albeit, technically, he asserted what is true, both subjectively (what he thinks to be 
true) and factually (what is actually the case).  
In comparison with the conditions set by Augustine for the analysis of case a), without 
prejudice to condition 1), in case b) Augustine alters conditions 2) and 3), whereby the 
speaker intends to deceive and says that which is de facto true. The conditions supposed by 
 
19  Mend. 4,4 (trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 56–57). 
20 De mend. 4,4 (trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 57). 
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Augustine for the analysis of case b) are, therefore, the following: 
 
1) The listener’s mistrust; 
2) The bona fide intention of the speaker; 
3) The speaker saying what is de facto the case (in fact, it turns out that there are 
robbers along a certain road). 
 
Augustine’s two illustrations of deception are revealing because they show that deceiving 
others requires an exercise of imagination by identifying with the other and forming an image 
of him or her. R. Mitchell (1986: 20), who studied deceit from a cognitive perspective, 
conceives of deception as fulfilling the following criteria: 
 
(i) An organism R registers something Y from organism S; 
(ii) R acts appropriately toward Y, because 
(iii) Y means X; and  
(iv) It is untrue that X is the case. 
 
From his research Mitchell constructed four levels of deception. The levels are ranked 
from the simplest to the most complex, thus are arranged according to an increasing level of 
cognitive complexity. Different levels of deception entail a different semiotic freedom. 
Mitchell’s fourth level of deception includes an element of planning in it, the intention to 
deceive as well as a modification of the deceiver’s behaviour or deceptive strategy «based on 
knowledge of the other’s past and present behaviour» (Mitchell 1986: 26).  
This point is important because it makes clear that a deception of such complexity must 
take into account the «awareness of another’s awareness on the part of the deceiver» 
(Mitchell 1986: 26). Thus, at this level of deception, there exists, as Mitchell writes, the 
«recognition of the animal’s belief about actions» (1986: 25). Along the same lines, the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett (1978) subscribes to a similar view holding that in order to 
intentionally deceive someone there must be a second-order intentional system, that is, the 
deceiver must have beliefs about the intended victim’s beliefs. This point is worth pondering 
because Augustine, through the skilful examples described above, considers the way in which 
the deceiver models his or her strategic moves according to the knowledge of the dupe’s 





My original intention in undertaking the present enquiry has been to explore the 
connection between deception and prediction. I have argued that the strategic significance of 
deceit in relation to human predictability should not be overlooked. As I have argued in the 
introductory section, not only the semiotics of deceit has not found the place that it would 
deserve within general semiotics, but the study of the role of prediction within deceptive 
interactions has been generally overlooked. Whilst numerous studies have been conducted on 
the prediction and detection of deception, much less was done to explain the predictive 
processing that goes on in the mind of the deceiver. My contention, thus, was that in the 
study of deceptive actions an element of prediction should be considered because it plays a 
role not at all secondary in the orchestration of a successful deceit. Needless to say, the 
present work does not exhaust the vast domain of the semiotics of deceit for this issue is far 
more complex than it is depicted here. This paper covers only one aspect of the issue, which 
would deserve a much longer examination.  
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This study argued that next to the characteristics that are generally considered as relevant 
for the understanding of deception – such as the intention to deceive, the manipulation of 
information, and the various strategies of deceit – the role of anticipation and the strategic 
and predictive thinking are aspects that should not be left unattended. This is especially 
apparent when the phenomenon of deception is studied from the perspective of strategic 
interactions. In such settings the ability to form an image of the other is key. Capitalising on 
Goffman’s intuition that in strategic settings one party always seeks to «dope out» the other’s 
moves, I have argued that forming an image of the other plays a significant role in deceptive 
actions, too.  
The image of the dupe operates, as it were, as a tool in the hand of the deceiver that uses it 
as a compass in order to decide the next possible moves to take according to the predictions 
made about the moves of the other. Thus, the image of the other serves as a template or a 
scenario which plays a remarkable role in the decision-making process and in the selection of 
the strategy that is adopted in a deceptive context. Such a deceptive scenario, understood as a 
gamut of possible future courses of action, aids the deceiver to form a strategy that is tailored 
to the image of the dupe. Needless to say, such a scenario can be more or less accurate and 
this yields to a fascinating game of guessing and outguessing, where one can perceive or 
misperceive, imagine and mis-imagine the other, and project onto others accurate of false 
hypothesis.   
The two cases of deception discussed in the concluding section aptly illustrate this 
dynamic. When in an interaction, one expects not to be believed by the listener, as in the case 
of the mistrustful hearer, the other interlocutor needs to adapt and calibrate his or her moves 
according to the belief system of the victim. The strategy of the deceiver, thus, not only 
entails an element of premeditation, but also shows an element of foreknowing and prediction 
that allows one party to outsmart the other.  
The case of the mistrustful hearer is similar to the example provided by Sigmund Freud 
based on a train conversation between two Jews, in which the possibility of deception is 
reduced to a sort of communicative game between the two interlocutors:  
 
Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a train station in Galicia. ‘Where are you going?’ asked one. ‘To 
Cracow,’ was the answer. ‘What a liar you are!’ broke out the other. ‘If you say you are going to Cracow, 
you want me to believe you are going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you are going to Cracow. So why 
are you lying to me’. (Freud 1960: 137–138) 
 
These are illustrations of psychological «acumen» which designates «a mode of knowing 
and thus of predicting» that «demands an identification of the analyst with the mind and the 
person of the other, the capacity to anticipate with fidelity the choices they will make, the 
mental corners they will turn» (Scheibe 1979: 40).  
In conclusion, forming an image of the other and anticipating the other’s possible moves is 
an essential aspect of the way in which deception operates in strategic interactions. A 
successful deceiver should have a specific skill, namely, the ability to form an accurate image 
of the other that would enable to tailor deceptive acts according to this predictive model. The 
production of a successful deceit, thus, entails a sophisticated set of assumptions by the 
deceiver, who must skilfully calibrate his or her strategy and tailor the deceptive plan in view 
of an image of the target. In other words, deception entails skills of high cognitive order such 
as perspective-taking and metacognition in order to take place. Ultimately, the deceiver must 
form a mental image of the dupe, the right evaluation of the dupe’s credibility, the ability to 
anticipate the future moves of his or her adversary, and to calibrate the course of action 
accordingly. The present study has argued that there exists a strategic and predictive element, 
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